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TRUSTEE'S TITLE IN BANKRUPTCY
ever, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Rabon would have done
well to have considered the warning enunciated by Justice Black in
Williams v. City of Detroit:
If we are to overrule, let us do it outright either way, manfully
according to the tried rules of judicial process. That is the only
way to avoid what Browning and Molitor already have proven;
that an appellate court, having determined to reward one litigant
only of a distinct and inseparable class of litigants, naively asks
for and gets into no end of trouble.8 '
To reduce the uneven treatment resulting from partially prospective
overruling, the preferable solution would have been for the court to
have chosen between wholly prospective and retroactive application. 2
JAmES A. MANNINO
Bankruptcy: Trustee's Title to Bankrupt's Property
In Bank of Marin v. England' a debtor drew five checks upon
his commercial account with the defendant bank. The debtor then
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy before the checks were pre-
sented for payment. Six days after the petition was filed, the bank,
having no notice of bankruptcy proceedings, paid the checks when
presented by the payee. The bankruptcy trustee sought to require
the bank to pay him the amount paid by the bank upon the five
checks. The referee found the bank and the payee jointly liable to
the bankrupt's estate for the amount of the checks and the district
court enforced this finding. The decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit2 holding that a bank that honors
checks in good faith without notice of voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy is liable to the bankruptcy trustee for the amount paid.2
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance
of the question presented, and reversed.
In 1938 Congress passed the Chandler Act amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act. These amendments were made necessary by the
"Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 278-79, 111 N.W.2d 1, 14(1961) (Concurring opinion).
" See generally Keeton, Creative Continuity In the Law of Torts, 75
HARV. L. Rav. 463 (1962).
'385 U.S. 99 (1966).
2 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965).
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many uncertainties surrounding the judicial interpretations of the
language of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.s The Chandler Act pro-
vided in section 70(a)4 that title would vest in the trustee in bank-
ruptcy by operation of law as of the date the petition in bankruptcy
is filed. This section was necessary to effectuate the well settled
objectives of federal bankruptcy legislation of protecting the rights
of creditors and facilitating the speedy and efficient distribution and
settlement of the estate.' The Chandler Act also added section
70(d)," which enumerates transfers whose validity will be upheld
if they take place after petition and before adjudication or before a
receiver takes possession of the bankrupt's property. Section 70(d)7
protects the transferee of personal property from the bankrupt if
the transfer was made in "good faith '8 and for "present fair equiv-
alent value."' The only provision exempting transactions occurring
after adjudication is section 21 (g),"o which allows real property to
be freely transferred, but only real estate located in the same county
or equivalent district as the bankrupt.
Section 70(d) (2)11 provides that a person indebted to the bank-
rupt can pay the indebtedness of the bankrupt without liability to
the trustee provided he acts in good faith and before adjudication of
Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565 (1898). See WEiN-
STEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW of 1938, 161 (1938); McLaughlin, Amend-
ment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARv. L. REv. 583 (1927).
' 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964).
4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 70.01, at 926 (14th ed. 1964). See Simonson
v. Granguist, 369 U.S. 38, 40 (1962); Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299
U.S. 445, 452 (1937).
'52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (1964).
"52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(1) (1964) reads in part:
A transfer of any of the property of the bankrupt, other than real
estate, made to a person acting in good faith shall be valid against
the trustee if made for a present fair equivalent value or, if not made
for a fair equivalent value, then to the extent of the present considera-
tion actually paid therefor, for which amount the transferee shall
have a lien upon the property so transferred ...
'Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(3), 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. (d)(3)
(1964) reads in part:
"A person having actual knowledge of such pending bankruptcy shall
be deemed not to act in good faith unless he has reasonable cause to
believe that the petition in bankruptcy is not well founded. .. ."
'In re Richter, 40 F. Supp. 758 (S.D. N.Y. 1941) (Satisfaction of old
debts not present value even though transferees extended new credit);
Lehman v. Quigley, 118 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 1952) (satisfaction of court
judgment on antecedent course of action is not a concurrence of a "present
fair equivalent value").10 52 Stat. 852 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 44(g) (1964).
152 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(2) (1964).
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bankruptcy. Under this section the bank would be protected if it
had honored the check after the filing of an involuntary petition but
before the adjudication of bankruptcy."2 However, section 18(f) 13
of the Bankruptcy Act provides that the filing of a voluntary peti-
tion constitutes automatic adjudication and thereby renders section
70(d) inapplicable. Thus in the case before us, since this was in
effect a post adjudication transfer, the bank would not be protected
by section 70(d) (1) or 70(d) (2).
The only other provision in section 70(d) that the bank could
have asserted as a defense is the negotiability proviso of 70(d)
(5).'-' But since the filing of a voluntary petition constitutes adjudi-
cation under section 18(f) it appears that bank payments subse-
quent to filing must be invalid. In Rosenthal v. Guaranty Bank &
Trust Co.'5 the court, basing its decision on the negotiability pro-
viso, upheld the validity of a good faith payment by a bank of a
bankrupt's checks after adjudication. However, this case has been
generally criticized'" on the grounds that presentation of a check
to the drawee bank for payment is not a negotiation. Thus it ap-
pears the negotiability proviso should not protect the drawee bank
in the Marin situation."
Therefore, it appears that a bank paying a check in good faith
without notice that the drawer has filed a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy will find no protection under section 70(d). The court of
appeals recognized the inequities of the situation but concluded that
it could not exercise its equitable powers because of section 70(d)'s
invalidation of post adjudication transfers.'" The decision in the
lower court put banks in the impossible position of keeping con-
stantly informed of every bankruptcy proceeding involving their
"Feldman v. Capitol Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.
1961); Citizens' Union National Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527 (6th Cir.
1923).
1352 Stat. 851 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1964).
1452 Stat. 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(5) (1964) which reads in
part: "Provided, however, that nothing in this title shall impair the negotia-
bility of currency or negotiable instruments."
15 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956).
" See 70 HAv. L. REv. 548 (1957).
"' The negotiability proviso is for the protection of the holder in due
course who receives payment prior to adjudication. Here the holder is al-
lowed to retain the proceeds and if payment is refused he can share in the
bankrupt's estate as an unsecured creditor. 70 HAv. L. Rzv. 548, 550
(1957).
18 Bank of Marin v. England, 352 F.2d 186, 191 (9th Cir. 1965).
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depositors in every federal court in the country. In addition, the
bank would be under the conflicting duty to honor checks drawn on
its depositors."
The Supreme Court, conceding that this transfer is not protected
by section 70 (d), circumvented sections 70 (a) and 18 (f) by basing
their decision on the due process requirement of notice, and over-
riding equitable considerations. The Court's first contention is that
the bankruptcy of a drawer does not, without more, revoke the
drawee's authority." The Court holds that notice, "reasonably cal-
culated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties
of the pendency of the action" is required before one can be deprived
of his property.2" Therefore, the Court was unwilling to say that
the mere filing of a voluntary petition was sufficient to put the bank
on notice. In the present Bankruptcy Act there are but limited pro-
visions for the giving of notice to the public of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Under section 58(d)' all notice to creditors is at the
discretion of the court, and creditors may not be entitled to personal
notice since bankruptcy proceedings are considered actions in rem.2
However, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co2
the Supreme Court held that personal notice to holders of trust
interests involved in the adjudication was necessary to meet due
process requirements. The Mullane decision, although not in a bank-
ruptcy setting, states that the difference between in rem and in
personam proceedings does not exist when dealing with the due pro-
cess rights of notice and opportunity to be heard. The Court in
Matin, in adopting the Mullane view, rejects the formalistic concept
of an in rem proceeding by notice to the world and requires reason-
able notice to the bank before liability will be imposed. The Court
does not indicate what will constitute reasonable notice. It would
seem that notice by publication is the least that will be required and
certainly this will not impose an onerous burden on the trustee since
he can easily ascertain where the bankrupt's funds are being held.
The Court also refuses to read sections 70(d) (5) and 18(f)
"° UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-506.
"
0Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 102 (1966).
21 Id.
22 52 Stat. 867 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 94(d) (1964).
" Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyes, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902).24339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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"with the ease of a computer"2 5 and invokes the equitable power
under section 2(a)20 of the act to reach an equitable result. It is
clear that a bankruptcy court is a court of equity and may exercise
these equitable powers in granting or withholding relief in its ad-
ministration the bankrupt's estate.2 7  However, these equitable
powers may only be exercised where the result produced will not be
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Act.2 Sections 70(d) and 18(f)
clearly indicate the Congressional intention to invalidate post ad-
judication transfers.2 9 It is also clear that the payment of funds
after adjudication frustrates one of the main objectives of the
Bankruptcy Act-preserving the estate for the benefit of creditors.
However, even if it is concluded that equitable relief, in the form
of validation of the transfer, is foreclosed by the act, an equitable
result may still be achieved and the estate preserved by simply ad-
justing the liabilities as between the bank and the creditor. This is,
in effect, what the Court did. They preserved sections 70(d) and
18(f) "by imposing liability on the payee of the checks as if he has
received a voidable preference or other voidable transfer."3
Aside from the inherent in equities in holding the bank liable in
this situation there are other compelling reasons for making the
trustee go only against the payee creditor. If the transaction with
the bankrupt constituted a voidable preference under section 60(a)-
(b) 8 1 of the act then multiple litigation may be avoided by suing
the payee first. This would be true in most cases because the subse-
quent presentment of the check to the bank should be sufficient evi-
dence of bad faith to allow the drawee bank to be indemnified for
the money paid out.3 2 Therefore in this situation, by suing the
payee first there will be no need for an indemnity suit.
2 Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 102 (1966).
"'52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a), reads in part:
".... courts of bankruptcy are hereby invested . . . with such juris-
diction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original
jurisdiction. .. ."
"'Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939).
8 Securities Comm'n v. U.S. Realty Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1939);
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
"4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.67, at 1500 (14th ed. 1964).
"0 Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
'152 Stat. 869 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. 96(a)-(b) (1964): A
voidable preference is a payment of an antecedent debt within four months
of bankruptcy with reasonable cause to believe the debtor is insolvent.
" Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah
2d 155, 160-61, 289 P.2d 1045, 1049 (1955).
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If the transfer were not a voidable transfer or if joint liability
were imposed there are still several ways to adjust the liability. It
does not seem that the liability should depend on whether payment
was in the form of check or cash. If this were payment of an ante-
cedent debt by cash it would not be a valid transfer since such a
payment is not for "present fair equivalent value." 33 If joint
liability were imposed in this situation the payee creditor would be
in a better position than the bankrupt's other creditors. If the bank
pays first and has no right of indemnity against the creditor, then
the creditor, to the extent of the bank's contribution, will be favored
over the other creditors. On the other hand, the bank's loss would
be total unless by subrogation it were allowed to participate in the
distribution of the bankrupt's estate. The right of subrogation here
would depend on whether this transaction was viewed as if the bank,
by paying the judgment, had paid the creditor's claim and thus stood
in his position as an unsecured creditor. 4 But if the creditor were
to pay the entire judgment, he would still be able to share in the
bankrupt's estate as an unsecured creditor.
The Court in Marin adopted the simplest and most equitable
solution in this situation by limiting the trustee to an action against
the payee. This would result in the payee bearing the entire loss
resulting from distribution by the bankrupt estate. In a situation,
as here, where the bank has had no notice of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding this is simply a restoration to the status quo.
FRANcIS X. HANLON
Constitutional Law-Is the Restricted Cross-Examination Rule
Embodied in the Fifth Amendm'nt?
In the historic Supreme Court decision of Malloy v. Hoga1 it
was established that the fifth amendment guarantee of freedom from
self-incrimination is imposed on the states by way of the fourteenth
amendment.' The recent case of Spevak v. Klien3 emphasized the
scope of this determination by holding that no group or classifica-
"See note 9 sitpra.
,See, 40 MINN. L. Iv. 499 (1956).
378 U.S. 1 (1964). See notes in 43 N.C.L. Rnv. 9 (1964); 73 YALE
L.J. 1491 (1964).
'U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part that no person "shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." For ex-
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